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Abstract
We examine the role of radical international differences in preferences in determining
patterns of international trade, given that the trading countries share a common technology
and identical factor endowment ratios. It is characteristic of our model that the equilibrium
autarkic commodity price ratios are unique and negative and that there is a unique positive
equilibrium free−trade price ratio, implying that the positive equilibrium free−trade price
ratio is not bounded by the equilibrium autarkic price ratios. This finding contrasts sharply
with the familiar Torrens−Ricardo and Heckscher−Ohlin propositions
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In the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade, two trading countries share
a common technology and common homothetic preferences but diﬀer in their factor en-
dowment ratios, which are therefore seen as determining the pattern of trade. In that
model, the equilibrium free-trade commodity price ratio is non-negative and, since the
preferences of each country are homothetic, bounded by the two equilibrium autarkic
price ratios. These properties persist whether or not production is joint.
In the present paper we construct a model which diﬀers from the standard model in
important details: First, the preferences of the trading countries diﬀer radically, in the
sense that any commodity which yields satisfaction in one country yields dissatisfaction
in the other; that is, any ”good” in one country is a “bad” in the other country. Such
a disparity in preferences might in turn be based on diﬀerences in climate or religious
belief. Second, the two countries share a technology in which the ﬁnal goods are jointly
produced, and which allows each country to dispose of its “bad” by sacriﬁcing some of its
”good”. (Under free trade the “bad” can also be disposed of by export.) Finally, there is
a single primary factor of production, available in the same amount to each family. There
is therefore no role for relative factor endowments in determining the pattern of trade.
It is characteristic of the model that, whether or not preferences are uniformly ho-
mothetic in each country, the equilibrium autarkic price ratios are unique and negative,
and there is a unique positive equilibrium free-trade price ratio but possibly several nega-
tive equilibrium free-trade price ratios. It follows that the positive equilibrium free-trade
price ratio is not bounded by the equilibrium autarkic price ratios. This ﬁnding con-
trasts sharply with the familiar Torrens-Ricardo proposition and with its Heckscher-Ohlin
counterpart already cited. Even when there are multiple free-trade equilibria, with the
additional free-trade price ratios negative, it remains true that no equilibrium free-trade
price ratio is strictly bounded by the equilibrium autarkic price ratios. Moreover, it turns
out that Marshallian local stability analysis, commonly preferred by trade theorists to
the alternative Walrasian analysis, is inapplicable at free-trade equilibria with negative
prices. On the other hand, the central proposition concerning trade gains (that, for each
country, free trade is potentially preferred to no trade) remains intact.
The jointness of production suggests the possibility of undesirable by-products the
disposal of which is costly. This in turn suggests the possibility of negative equilibrium
prices, at least in a closed economy. What is surprising is that this latter possibility
1survives in a world economy in which no commodity is everywhere undesirable and in
which the national economies are of approximately the same size.
2 Autarkic Equilibria
There are two countries, the home country and the foreign. In each country, two com-
modities, 1 and 2, are jointly produced by a single primary factor of production, labour,
with one unit of labour yielding one unit of commodity 1 and a units of commodity 2.
The home country is endowed with L units of labour, the foreign country with L¤ units.
In the home country, households view commodity 1 as a good, commodity 2 as a bad;
conversely in the foreign country.
Commodities 1 and 2 are disposable, at a cost. To dispose of one unit of commodity
i; bij > 0 units of commodity j are needed (i;j = 1;2;i 6= j). However, for the time being
it will be assumed that b12 > a > 1=b21. Each country chooses the method of disposal
appropriate to its preferences. Thus the relevant home production possibility locus is
AB in Figure 1(a), where the slope of AB is maxfb12;1=b21g and the length of OA is
proportional to L; and the relevant foreign production possibility locus is A¤B¤ in Figure
1(b), where the slope of A¤B¤ is minfb12;1=b21g and the length of O¤A¤ is proportional
to L¤.
In Figure 1, II is a typical Scitovsky community indiﬀerence curve of the home country
and I¤I¤ is a typical Scitovsky curve of the foreign country. Points E and E¤ represent the
unique autarkic equilibria of the home and foreign countries, with negative equilibrium
price ratios indicated by (minus) the slopes of AB and A¤B¤. As indicated by the ﬁgure,
each country chooses to rid itself of some but not all of its “bad”.
3 Free-Trade Equilibria
Given the assumptions introduced in section 2, we can derive the home and foreign oﬀer
curves. These are displayed in Figures 2 and 3. Spinning Figure 3 through 180 and
superimposing it on Figure 2, we obtain Figure 4. In the unique equilibrium marked by
E, each country imports its preferred commodity, implying that the equilibrium terms
of trade are positive. Since the autarkic price ratios are negative, they do not bound the
world price ratio. Thus the familiar Torrens-Ricardo proposition has no counterpart in
the present model. Moreover it can be veriﬁed that this is so even when preferences are
uniformly homothetic in each trading country.
Nevertheless multiple equilibria are possible and can be obtained by varying the details
of the common technology and of the country-speciﬁc preferences. However the additional
equilibria always appear in the ﬁrst and/or third quadrants, as in Figure 5. In those
quadrants, one country exports both commodities, implying that the equilibrium world
price ratio is negative. Thus it remains true that there is a unique positive price ratio
2and that it is not bounded by the two equilibrium autarkic price ratios. In fact it remains
true that no equilibrium free-trade price ratio, positive or negative, is strictly bounded
by the equilibrium autarkic price ratios.
In spite of the novel features of the world equilibria, each country gains from trade,
in the weak sense that it is not harmed. A proof may be based on McKenzie’s (1959,
1981) demonstration of the existence of a competitive general equilibrium, extended to
accommodate two trading countries and one or more schemes of lump sum compensation.
Thus if the free-trade equilibrium is represented by point E in Figure 4 or Figure 5 then
each country is clearly better oﬀ than in autarky; and if the free-trade equilibrium is
represented by E1; E2; E3 or E4 in Figure 5 then at least one country is better oﬀ (the
other not worse oﬀ) than in autarky.
4 Extensions
In Sections 2 and 3 it was assumed that b12 > a > 1=b21 so that, in Figure 1, the slope of
OA is bounded by the slopes of AB and A¤B¤. Other cases can be examined, with little
change in conclusions. Thus if a > b12 > 1=b21 then the straight and positively-sloped
segment of the home oﬀer curve HH has slope a (not b12); and if b12 > 1=b21 > a then
the straight and positively-sloped segment of the foreign oﬀer curve FF has slope a (not
1=b21).
It has been assumed also that, in each country, aggregate preferences can be repre-
sented by a family of non-intersecting Scitovsky indiﬀerence curves. The assumption has
been convenient, but only as an expository device. The reader may easily verify that all
of our propositions, including those concerning the gains from trade, remain valid when
the assumption is relaxed so that, in each country, preferences and labour endowments
can diﬀer from family to family while a radical international disparity of preferences is
retained.
5 Final Remark
The analysis has been entirely static. Nothing has been said about the stability or
instability of the equilibria; in particular, nothing has been said about the stability of
the free-trade equilibria. In conclusion, we seek to make good this oversight. In the
simple case depicted in Figure 4, there is a single equilibrium and the equilibrium price is
positive. It is straightforward to conﬁrm that the equilibrium is locally stable, both in the
sense of Walras and in the sense of Marshall. In the case depicted in Figure 5, however,
matters are more complicated. The unique equilibrium in quadrant 2 is characterized
by a positive price ratio and local stability, both in the sense of Walras and in the sense
of Marshall. The remaining equilibria, in Quadrants 1 and 3, are characterized by a
negative price ratio and alternating Walrasian stability and instability, beginning with
3stability at E1. However it is not possible to follow the Marshallian approach. For, when
both commodities are exported by the same country, there is no single “supply price”
associated with an equilibrium.
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